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Spilling the Beans: Teaching and Contract Law 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores contradictions within the Enlightenment account of 
pedagogy as expressed in Rousseau’s Émile. It does so by focusing on one specific 
narrated event in Rousseau’s text which concerns itself with questions of responsibility 
and the law.  
     * 
Keywords:  Rousseau. Derrida. Deconstruction. Literary Theory. Educational Theory. 
Cultural Theory. 
 
 
The law of teaching currently models itself on contract law. The student contracts 
into the university, the department and the individual module. The lecturer/teacher 
contracts with the student via the legal, judicial apparatus of the university, to deliver pre-
announced, pre-advertised modules as part of a department’s syllabus. In this age of 
transparency and performativity, of modularization and quality-audit, a whole range of 
contractual obligations are set out for the signature of the student and the signature 
(implied by their employment status within the semi-judicial body of the university) of 
the teacher. Of course, the model of contract law immediately comes crashing up against 
the traditional university principle of academic freedom. A huge question about how 
academic freedom (which is supposed to be unconditional) relates to the contract law 
model of teaching and course delivery immediately threatens to generate a host of 
irresolvable problems. If the module elected by a student, for example, is one in English 
literature and states in its advertised course content that it will cover six novels by 
Charles Dickens, then has there been a breach in the contract if the lecturer responsible 
for delivering the module only covers four novels by Dickens? The answer is 
unquestionably yes. The students are unlikely to, but they could legitimately complain 
that a contract has been broken by the teacher in this instance.  
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What are the limits of this kind of contract? this legal imperative which makes us 
all, as teachers, figures of contract law?  Say a module states that it will introduce 
students to the origins of literary theory and it is delivered by a lecturer who favours the 
deconstructive school of philosophy and literary theory and thus teaches that the very 
idea of origins is logocentric and irresolvably problematic and so must be placed under 
erasure, and so does not in this sense teach “the origins of literary theory” but in stead 
teaches that there are in fact no origins for literary theory. Has a contract been broken in 
this instance? or has the principle of academic freedom drawn invisible quotation marks 
around the word “origins” in the course description, thus allowing (juridically) for the 
kinds of ironies typically indulged in by teachers of a deconstructive bent? If our answer 
is the latter option, then where do these invisible, ironizing, liberating quotation marks 
end? When does academic freedom (the principle that the teacher can say, rationally, in 
reason, in the name of reason, anything about anything) meet the contract law model of 
module delivery (which states that the teacher is limited in what he or she can do within 
specific modules and syllabi)?  
In the context of the apparent need to legislate over the creative work of faculty 
staff, we have recently been discussing the concept of contractual obligations in the 
Research Committee of the Faculty of Arts, University College Cork. I refer to the 
Faculty of Arts, although in the restructuring process University College Cork has 
entered into since 2004 the Faculty is, as I write, destined to become a College and to be 
renamed the College of Arts, Celtic Civilization and Social Sciences; significantly, this 
new College, replacing the traditional Faculty of Arts, is to be separated from the Law 
Faculty, with which it formerly enjoined a twinned Faculty status. Under the new College 
structure, already adopted in similar restructuring processes by many universities in other 
countries, the former Law Faculty is to be joined, in a College of Business and Law, with 
Commerce, Economics and Education. Law, apparently, is no longer cognate with the 
Arts and the Humanities, or even the Social Sciences, but is in fact, or apparently, most 
directly identifiable and, as they say, “bed-able” with Commerce, Economics and, this 
particular example of contemporary bed-ability is most striking, Education.  
In our discussions in the Research Committee about creativity and contractual 
obligations one of my responsibilities, as a theorist, was to suggest to my colleagues that 
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the concept of “contractual obligations” with regard to research is a minefield. I think I 
succeeded, to a point. But the same goes for teaching, in the Humanities and the 
university generally. If Derrida is right and the university is unconditional, in both senses 
of the term, then how as it must, or rather as it will, does the university (considered as a 
judicial, legislative and executive body) specify, locate and enforce contractual 
obligations, the law of contract for teachers and researchers? Derrida states: 
 
the modern university should be without condition. By “modern university,” let us 
understand the one whose European model, after a rich and complex medieval 
history, has become prevalent, which is to say “classic,” over the last two 
centuries in states of a democratic type. This university claims and ought to be 
granted in principle, besides what is called academic freedom, an unconditional 
freedom to question and to assert, or even, going still further, the right to say 
publicly all that is required by research, knowledge, and thought concerning the 
truth.
1
  
 
This passage from Derrida is the basis upon which I would ask a question, or a set of 
questions about contractual obligations and the law of contract which today comes before 
teaching. I want to quote one other brief section of the Derrida essay I have been 
referring to: 
 
Here then is what I will call the unconditional university or the university without 
condition: the principial right to say everything, whether it be under the heading 
of fiction and the experimentation of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, 
to publish it. (26) 
                                                 
1 . Jacques Derrida, “The future of the profession or the university without condition (thanks to the ‘Humanities, what 
could take place tomorrow), Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001: 24-57 (24). The other side of “unconditionality,” for Derrida, concerns the lack of 
any literal, permanent and reasonable foundation for the idea of the university itself. As he puts it: “if this 
unconditionality, in principle and de jure, makes for the invincible force of the university, it has never been in effect . . . 
. I also say ‘without condition’ to let one hear the connotation of ‘without power’ and ‘without defense.’ Because it is 
absolutely independent, the university is also an exposed, tendered citadel, to be taken, often destined to capitulate 
without condition, to surrender unconditionally. It gives itself up, it sometimes puts itself up for sale, it risks being 
simply something to occupy, take over, buy; it risks becoming a branch office of conglomerates and corporations. This 
is today, in the United States and throughout the world, a major political stake….” (27-8)   
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If a university is a place in which anything, in the name of reason, can, 
potentially, be said about anything, where people have a right to say “everything,” then 
where is the point, the border, the line at which contractual obligations, especially in 
teaching, locates itself? We tend, in a kind of extension and revision of the Kantian 
model, to locate that border, the point of contact and conflict, between “us” as academic 
men and women “of” the university and what Gregg Lambert, returning to the conflict of 
the faculties in the post-modern age, calls the “fifth” faculty, the new faculty of 
administrative and bureaucratic agency which now appears to run the institution.
2
 But 
one does not have to be an avid reader of Derrida’s work on the university to realise that 
a series of folds, of inversions perpetually undermine such a neat architectonics, such a 
clean topology. It may well be that the border-line, the point of contact, conflict, of force 
between the principle of academic freedom and the law of contractual obligation occurs 
much closer to home, within our own faculty, our own departments, our own teaching, 
within us.
3
 
My title is a reference to a rather characteristic episode in Rousseau’s Émile. It is 
a philosophical example and a literary one. Rousseau is discussing how we might 
inculcate an understanding of property in a pre-pubescent student. Rousseau’s teacher 
goes about this task by helping the child to plant beans in the family garden. This seems 
logical and unobjectionable. The child has observed the gardener working and obviously 
wants to copy him. Rousseau’s teacher wants to inculcate an understanding of property in 
the child and so he encourages Émile in the art of planting and patient nurturing. An 
eminently pedagogical scene, we might say. The only problem is that Rousseau’s teacher 
has made sure that they plant the beans in a patch of ground in which the gardener had 
already planted some rare Maltese melons. When the gardener sees that his work has 
                                                 
2 . See Gregg Lambert, Report to the Faculty (Re: The NEW Conflict of the Faculties), Auroro, CO: The Davies Group, 
2001. 
3 . The idea of belonging to a body and to a body with apperception (as in the faculty of sight or the faculty of reason) 
is, it would seem, currently being restructured out of the university’s own self-image and the university’s language 
about itself. Indeed, the entire Kantian “architectonics” which builds the modern idea of the university around a 
synecdochal “conflict of the faculties” seems destined (in the United Kingdom, in Ireland and no doubt elsewhere, one 
thinks here of the projection of a European Higher Educational Area by the year 2010 in which all differences are 
simultaneously eradicated and preserved) to be replaced by an educationally sensible and yet in many ways 
uninhabitable (because lacking a faculty to see, to speak and to think and thus, in that sense, in-sensible) collegiate 
system. 
 5 
been destroyed he is furious and verbally attacks Émile. The teacher brokers a peace 
between the two, but the point is, of course, that the child has been taught something 
about “the principle of property.”4 The scene is typical of the teaching philosophy of 
Rousseau in Émile. Rousseau concludes the scene by summing up in this fashion: 
“Young teacher, pray consider this example, and remember that your lessons should 
always be in deeds rather than words, for children soon forget what they say or what is 
said to them, but not what they have done and what has been done to them.” (75) The 
Rousseauvian teacher is a double, an ironic agent, a figure who says one thing while he 
does another. Rousseau’s teacher is someone who manipulates appearances and words in 
order to impress the student through experience first. As Rousseau states:  
 
Let him [your pupil] always think he is master while you are really master. There 
is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is 
thus that the will itself is taken captive. Is not this poor child, without knowledge, 
strength, or wisdom, entirely at your mercy? Are you not master of his whole 
environment so far as it affects him? Cannot you make of him what you please? 
His work and play, his pleasure and pain, are they not, unknown to him, under 
your control? No doubt he ought only to do what he wants, but he ought to want 
to do nothing but what you want him to do. He should never take a step you have 
not foreseen, nor utter a word you could not foretell. (100) 
 
It is difficult to imagine how Rousseau, if he were living now, would square his 
philosophy of teaching with current demands for transparency under the model of 
contract law. A modern Rousseauvian first year module description is perhaps a rather 
ludicrous thing to imagine and script, and if only in that sense, then, worthwhile: You will 
be taught in an environment which gives you the impression that you are completely free 
to pursue your own inclinations, whilst in fact you will be manipulated at every turn by a 
teacher who appears to be simply your friend but in fact will be your master. Everything 
you believe you are learning will turn out merely to be the pretence for a programme of 
education never explicitly explained to you, or at least not until well after the event. You 
                                                 
4 . Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, trans. Barbara Foxley, London: J. M. Dent, 1993: 73. 
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will be manipulated and even duped into learning in an excellent, quality-controlled 
fashion. It would never be allowed to come before Faculty (or, now, the College), never 
mind being submitted for approval to the Registrar or the Executive Dean. How could the 
university possibly audit for quality and excellence a teaching which methodically said 
one thing whilst it did another? How could you ever establish a pedagogical contract 
based on duplicity, deception, mastery disguised as friendship and freedom of choice? 
How could an institution legislate for a teaching practice which had built into it such a 
duplicitous, delayed unveiling of aims and objectives? such a refusal to enter into any 
contract, save for an unspecified, contentless contract to teach? 
It could be argued, and in fact it has been argued many times before, that 
Rousseau’s philosophy of education is precisely pedagogical, a philosophy concerning 
the teaching of children, pre-pubescents, whereas what we are doing in universities is to 
teach adults, students who can legally vote, smoke, have sex, drive cars, purchase 
alcohol, vote in elections and referendums, and gamble on the stock-exchange. We can be 
transparent in our educational aims and objectives with our students in university 
settings, since they are adults not children, and we are educators not pedagogues. This 
objection to the Rousseauvian model is an historical objection: that is to say we can find 
it in numerous places, numerous texts. In fact it can be said to be part of an 
Enlightenment critique of pedagogical mastery and thus duplicity and irony which 
Rousseau’s seminal text did not originate but certainly ignited. This is a history which 
concerns questions about the limits and ends of childhood, the possibility of a faculty of 
reason outside of power structures and ideological formations, and questions concerning 
the very nature of teaching, or what we can call the figures of teaching: informing, 
conveyance, the inculcation of erziehung or bildung, the rendering of reason, vocational, 
technological and cultural instruction, enlightenment, remembering, animation, archival 
training, a certain burning of the archive, didactics, the institutional perpetuation of class 
distinctions through social reproduction, and so on.
5
  
                                                 
5 . I  use the terms erziehung and bildung in the manner in which they feature in Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Future of 
Our Educational Institutions, trans. Michael W. Grenke, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004. Grenke writes: 
“Erziehung means most literally a ‘drawing out,’ and it is related to midwifing; in typical usage it applies to earlier 
education, and could be translated as ‘rearing.’ Bildung means most literally ‘formation,’ and it is connected to having 
an image [Bild] or form. Sorting out the different meanings of these terms is one of the major tasks that faces the reader 
of these lectures.” (viii) 
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One of the problems of legislating for teaching is that we are not at all clear what 
teaching is. In fact, we can go further and say that teaching is not and never has been 
identical to itself. There is a conflict over teaching which is far older than the modern 
university; as old, in fact, as philosophy itself.  Derrida states in his “The Crisis in 
Teaching”: “the permanent, founding, instituting crisis of philosophy will always have 
been simultaneously a crisis of the pedagogical.”6 One could philosophically consider 
whether teaching can ever be what a certain strand of the Enlightenment desires it to be: 
that is singular, rational, understanding reason in terms of a direct, unswerving, non-
tropological communication; a direct and successful rendering of reason, to employ the 
phrase of Leibniz discussed by Derrida in his essay on the pupils of the university.
7
 One 
could of course spend much time considering the manner in which a certain 
Enlightenment ideal of teaching, beyond the “magisterial voice,” coincides, in terms of 
an idea of transparency, with the modern, techno-scientific, performative culture of 
today’s third level educational institutions. One could also philosophically consider 
whether education, in its institutional settings, can ever escape from the kind of social 
reproduction of power and inequality analyzed in the work of Pierre Bourdieu.
8
 
Bourdieu’s vision of education as social reproduction is the dark, rather humourless, 
pessimistic (or perhaps inverted), irony-free extreme of a tradition throughout the 
Enlightenment which would argue that rational education requires, eventually, or in some 
cases immediately, the disappearance of the teacher.  
One could cite here Jacques Ranciére, an opponent of Bourdieu’s, and his work 
on the nineteenth-century radical pedagogue, Joseph Jacotot.
9
 Joseph Jacotot became 
famous in the early decades of the nineteenth-century for developing a pedagogical 
practice in which he taught students subjects he knew nothing about. For Jacotot, all that 
was needed for education was verification: an illiterate peasant father could teach his son 
or daughter to read, simply by verifying that they had learnt something when they 
                                                 
6 . Jacques Derrida, “The Crisis in Teaching” in Who’s Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1, trans. Jan Plug, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002: 99-116 (107). 
7 . Jacques Derrida, “The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils” in Eyes of the University: Right 
to Philosophy 2, trans Jan Plug and others, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004:129-55. 
8 . See Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 2nd Ed., trans. 
Richard Nice, London: Sage Publications, 1990. 
9 . Jacques Ranciére, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, trans. Kristin Ross, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991. 
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attempted to read. For Jacotot, as for Bourdieu, education in its institutional form is a 
kind of violent stultification and malforming (brutalization) of the young, since, at least 
for Ranciére via Jacotot, it begins by insisting that people cannot learn on their own. It 
does this by establishing “a temporal structure of delay” into all teaching, by demanding 
that all students contract into the idea that they do not know what they need to know and 
that only the teacher can, slowly, give them what they need. Institutional education, with 
its insistence on explication, that is to say, creates the very ignorance it promises to annul. 
As Ranciére puts it: 
 
The revelation that came to Joseph Jacotot amounts to this: the logic of the 
explicative system had to be overturned. Explication is not necessary to remedy 
an incapacity to understand. On the contrary, that very incapacity provides the 
structuring fiction of the explicative conception of the world. It is the explicator 
who needs the incapable and not the other way around; it is he who constitutes the 
incapable as such. To explain something to someone is first of all to show him he 
cannot understand it by himself. Before being the act of the pedagogue, 
explication is the myth of pedagogy, the parable of a world divided into knowing 
minds and ignorant ones, ripe minds and immature ones, the capable and the 
incapable, the intelligent and the stupid. The explicator’s special trick consists of 
this double inaugural gesture. On the one hand, he decrees the absolute beginning: 
it is only now that the act of learning will begin. On the other, having thrown a 
veil of ignorance over everything that is to be learned, he appoints himself to the 
task of lifting it. (6-7)  
 
Jacotot’s method of “universal emancipation” became hugely popular for a while 
in the early nineteenth century. Various institutions began to employ it as a method and 
thus to transform it into a professional teaching technique which, unsurprisingly, went 
directly against Jacotot’s own beliefs and practices. As an historical allegory the story of 
Jacotot’s method can speak to us, since, ironically, a certain modern version of the 
eradication of the educational delay could be said to emerge in the current contract model 
of teaching in our institutions of higher education. We are increasingly before the Law as 
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teachers. We teach in institutions which increasingly lay down the law of teaching. And 
that law demands that we deliver, before the scene of instruction begins, what we say we 
will deliver, during the scene of instruction. This juridical imperative threatens to flatten 
out teaching into a process purely concerned with a successful, direct, undeviating 
delivery, by which I mean it threatens to eradicate from teaching the temporal structure of 
delay. To get into a debate over a certain Enlightenment ideal of the disappearance of the 
teacher is beyond my powers in this essay. I will say, however, that only the teacher can 
make him- or herself disappear. You need teachers if the teacher is ever going to 
disappear. Which is perhaps equivalent to saying that you need the delay in educational 
practice if the delay is ever to be eradicated.
10
 Teaching is a practice which, if it occurs, 
involves a deconstructive process which can look very much like an identity crisis.   
My title concerns the fact that it is increasingly difficult in transparent 
universities, universities which present themselves as see-through, as systematized and 
perpetually audited, to spill the beans about teaching’s perpetual identity crisis. It is 
increasingly difficult, nowadays, to speak about the irresolvable problems and aporias 
within the idea of teaching, now that teaching is so explicitly legislated for and so 
transparently contracted. Where, after all, would we nowadays spill the beans about 
teaching? A big part of the lesson over the beans and the melons concerns the fact that 
the young Émile did not know that people owned the land, did not know anything about 
the law of property. As the gardener explains: “there is no more waste ground. I dig what 
my father tilled; every one does the same, and all the land that you see has been occupied 
time out of mind.” (Émile: 75) The Rousseauvian preceptor then negotiates with the 
gardener in a kind of leasing contract, making an agreement that the boy will get a corner 
of the garden to sow his beans, if he gives away half the crop. The gardener’s reply is I 
think priceless: “You may have it free. But remember I shall dig up your beans if you 
                                                 
10 . The issue here, of course, returns to the institutional scene of teaching and how teachers position themselves within 
the inevitably double, divided, space of the university, the college (in its more traditional sense), the school. This point, 
about the divided, doubling nature of institutional spaces for the scene of teaching, is where Ranciére’s liberatory, 
Enlightenment account of the “Jacotot method” circles round to meet the vastly more pessimistic, sociological vision of 
Bourdieu. What I am suggesting here, admittedly in far too broad strokes, is that the ultimate question for teachers 
working before the Law of Teaching today, may well lie somewhere between these two dialectically related positions 
(Ranciére’s and Bourdieu’s), in a space, that is, that neither purely liberatory nor purely sociological perspectives can in 
themselves locate, describe or question. For an excellent reading of Ranciére’s work on Jacotot, which takes a 
somewhat different line of approach than my own, see Forbes Morlock “The Story of the Ignorant Schoolmaster/The 
Adventures of Telemachus, For Example” in OLR, Knowledge, Learning and Migration, ed. Caroline Rooney, 19.1-2, 
1997: 105-132. 
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touch my melons.” In today’s university it can often seem as if no similar negotiation is 
available to us. As teachers who would engage in the philosophy of education, where can 
we spill the beans about the non-identical dimensions of teaching, now that education 
exists before the law, now that our educational institutions have a philosophy of teaching 
modelled on, informed by, contract law? Teaching now, in the transparent university, is; 
teaching, now, will be. Contract law, the legal imperative of a successful delivery of pre-
advertised outcomes, flattens teaching (or at least threatens to flatten teaching) into a 
mode of conveyance or delivery without delay. Spilling the beans about teaching, or, in 
other words, philosophically thinking and talking about teaching’s perpetual identity 
crisis, has become a very difficult thing to do nowadays, as I have suggested elsewhere, 
since teaching now is increasingly legislated for both in terms of contract law and the 
increasing influence (frequently enforced through legislative means) of “philosophies” of 
teaching which figure teaching in terms of service, reflexive self-auditing and a general 
ideology of accountable, systematized delivery.
11
 In such an environment any philosophy 
of teaching which spills the beans about teaching’s non-identical nature will necessarily 
appear as a delay in delivery, and thus an attack on transparent, accountable, quality 
teaching. In such contexts, the teacher who believes (for whatever reason – and there are 
many, and they are in perpetual conflict) that teaching involves some kind of delay, a 
process in which outcomes cannot be specified or even, for some, guaranteed, or, for 
some, even imagined, might come to the conclusion that teaching itself is under threat. 
My title is also meant, as is evident from what I have just said, to alert us to the 
question of teaching itself, as opposed to its philosophy (and where the one ends and the 
other begins is a question I can only pose here). Despite Ranciére’s retelling of the 
Jacotot story, teaching can be considered as a spilling of the beans, in the sense of 
planting, scattering, disseminating. A delayed process. A process which, because it is 
delayed, necessarily delayed, contains the possibility and perhaps even the inevitability of 
chance, of the incalculable and the unpredictable, within it. A process of delayed in-
forming (or bildung), or drawing out (erziehung), which also, as our example from  
Rousseau has suggested, and as both Bourdieu and Ranciére in their different ways would 
                                                 
11 . Graham Allen, “You are Here: The Time of Teaching,” Language – Text – Bildung, Sprache – Text – Bildung, 
Essays in Honour of Beate Dreike, eds. Andreas Stuhlmann and Patrick Studer, In Cooparation with Gert Hofmann, 
Berlin: Peter Lang, 2005: 233-49. 
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confirm, involves within it a form, or perhaps forms, of violence or force (gewalt).
12
 
Teaching as spilling the beans, as a delayed process of drawing out or in-forming, a 
process which seems to open up the possibility of the incalculable, the random, a process 
lacking guarantee, and potentially involving violence and force, certainly duplicity, a 
doubleness within the teacher: can we do this any more? Can we teach in this sense, of 
spilling the beans, of drawing out and in-forming, of erziehung and bildung? 
If we look at our own institution’s literature, its proliferating number of self-
descriptions, then the answer comes back to us as a resounding yes. Sometimes positivity 
is less than reassuring, however. We might look, for example, at the Student Charter, 
distributed to each new student of University College Cork (but no doubt replicated in 
universities throughout the world) on their entrance into the university. The Student’s 
Charter is a document which presents itself as a contract between the university (as a 
collective) and each individual student (addressed as “you”). It also begins by explaining 
that it is not a legal document and has no legal status, gives no rights nor establishes any 
legal obligations. A strange speech-act, in fact. It can be read as an astonishingly clear 
example of the eradication of the temporal structure of delay in teaching. Students, 
according to the Charter can expect, for example, “Courses which produce high quality 
graduates.” There is no possibility, apparently, that this expectation will not be realised. 
But who is performing the act of expectation here? the individual student who is being 
informed of a contract that is not legally binding? or the student-body as a whole to 
which the individual student belongs? You do not make contracts with collective student-
bodies. And yet an institution cannot afford to contract anything specific about results, 
about satisfaction, about quality with individual students. Or rather, it has to be seen to do 
that, whilst knowing that it is impossible to do so. There is an aporia at the heart of this 
legally redundant document – and there are a proliferating number of similar documents 
in this and every other university – an aporia which goes to the heart of the uneasy 
relation between contract law and teaching, and indeed the uneasy relation teaching has 
with itself.  
                                                 
12 . For the manner in which “gewalt” involves notions of violence and of force see Derrida’s reading of Benjamin’s 
“Critique of Violence” in “Force of Law”, Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar, London and New York: Routledge, 2002: 
228-98; for Benjamin’s text, see Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume I: 1913-1926, eds. Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Cambridge, Mass. And London: Harvard University Press, 1997: 236-
52. 
 12 
Teaching obviously depends upon a legal or non-legal contract to teach. A 
contract with each individual student. A contract which can only be realised by teaching a 
student body. There can be no teaching without an implied contract to teach. Without 
such a contract there would never be any students. And yet this contract seems to say to 
each and every student you will be taught, we promise to teach you, but in order to fulfil 
that contract, that promise, we cannot teach you, you as an individual. The contract to 
teach, the promise of quality teaching, must be addressed to each individual student (you 
cannot make a contract with a batch of students), and yet it is a contract, a promise, which 
in order to be made must include the possibility, for each individual student, of failure. It 
is a contract with an addressee who, if teaching does occur, will not be exactly the same 
addressee as the one who entered into the contract on registration. The university’s 
promise to teach is always addressed to an individual to whom the university cannot 
directly speak and cannot directly, individually, teach. Teaching, the drawing out and the 
drawing in of reason, technique, culture, formation, can only ever be an individual – 
teacher to student – process. Teaching, in educational institutions, can only ever be, as a 
contractual obligation, as a quality assured promise to teach, a delivery to a collective 
body addressed as if it were made up of individuals. The responsibility of educational 
institutions to teach is aporetic. We know this aporia of responsibility from Derrida; it is 
the aporia exemplified in “the paradox of Abraham” and the phrase “tout autre est tout 
autre (every other [one] is every [bit] other)”.13 
What I want to say is best said, here, in a series of statements. Teaching is and 
must be contractual; teaching, if it is to happen, must be a break with all contracts. 
Teaching must be and must not be legal, legislated for, before the Law. There must be 
and there must not be a law for teaching. Which is perhaps to say that teaching is, or is 
something like, deconstruction. Which is also perhaps to say something like the 
following: teaching is impossible, impossible and indispensable; impossible and a 
primary responsibility; impossibly possible, as Derrida would say. Or, to adapt what he 
says about translation: teaching is impossible and can happen every day.
14
 
                                                 
13 . See, for example, Derrida’s The Gift of Death, trans. David Willis, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1995. 
14 . Jacques Derrida, “Living On/Border Lines” in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom, New York: 
Seabury Press, 1980: 75-176 
 13 
 
Graham Allen, University College Cork 
 14 
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